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THE MEANING OF THE FEDERAL RULE ON EVIDENCE
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
When, in 1886, the United States Supreme Court decided the
Boyd case I out of which arose the federal rule against illegally
seized evidence, the exigencies of a prohibition era could not have
I Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
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been foreseen. Cases in which evidence had been procured by
unconstitutional searches and seizures were relatively infrequent.
The court, therefore, was confronted with no practical difficulty
in adopting a policy based purely upon history. But an entirely
different situation prevails today. The courts in jurisdictions
where the rule is followed are crowded with prohibition cases
and the most popular mode of defense is to seek the suppression
of evidence on the ground that it was unreasonably seized.2
The application of the federal rule to these new conditions has
not been easy. The purpose of the rule as an auxiliary to the
Constitution has often been found incompatible with the task
of enforcing present day laws, and courts have been willing to
forego the former to accomplish the latter 2 As a result of this
tendency, many exceptions and limitations of the federal rule
have arisen which have greatly narrowed the scope that the rule
was originally thought to have.4
2A n examination of volumes of the American Digest system discloses
that since January 16, 1920, the date the National Prohibition Act bccame
effective, more than 700 cases involving the admissibility of illegally ob-
tained evidence were reported. Of this number approximately 575 have
been prosecutions for violations of the liquor laws. As many as 490 were
decisions in federal jurisdictions and in 290 of those cases the courts ad-
mitted evidence under exceptions to the rule. The intimate relation of
this rule to prohibition enforcement is further illustrated by the fact that
the number of liquor cases turning upon the rule has increased from four,
during the first year, to more than 220 during the past year.
These cases indicate that, in addition to the federal courts, the following
states still observe the rule: Alaska, fllinois, Indiana, Kcntucky, M"Tichigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, TennesTse, Washington,
West Virginia, Wyoming and Wisconsin. Since prohibition began, the fol-
lowing states have discarded the rule: Alabama, Iowa, New Yor!; and South
Carolina. On the other hand, the rule has been subsequently adopted by
Missouri, Montana, Ohio and Alaska. Litigation in states which have not
adopted the federal rule has consisted merely in a few rciterationm of the
more general rule. Cf. State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl.
636 (1924); Hall v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 554, 130 S. E. 416 (192;).
One notable exception has been Texas where the general rule was rcaffrmcd
in more than fifty cases until a restrictive law was introduced by the
legislature. Tex. Laws 1925, c. 149. Cf. Deaver v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. App.
575, 231 S. W. 861 (1926) (introducing exceptions to the statute). In
Mississippi a statute (Laws 1924, c. 244, par. 3) abolishing the federal
rule was declared unconstitutional. Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 134, 105 So.
465 (1925).
3 "An unlawful arrest of an offender does not work a pardon in his be-
half. . . . See United States v. Fenton, 20S Fed. 221, 222 (D. Mont.
1920). "Every constitutional or statutory provision must be construed, with
the purpose of giving effect, if possible, to every other constitutional and
statutory provision and in view of new conditions and new circumstances in
the progress of the nation and the state." Nulan v. United States, 296
Fed. 629, 631 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924). See also the excellent opinion of Car-
dozo, J., in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926) in which
the New York Court of Appeals unequivocally rejected the federal rule.
4 It is not within the scope of this comment to review past events in the
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The first and most important limitation of the federal rule
is the requirement that the legality of the seizure be determined
by motion before trial5 This qualification was made expressly
for the purpose of reconciling the rule with the more general
proposition that the trial court will not question the source of
relevant evidence. But the readiness of the courts applying the
federal rule thus to compromise, weakens their main argument
that the rule is a necessary adjunct of the Constitution." Em-
phasis placed upon the preliminary motion obscures the constitu-
tional foundations of the rule and characterizes it as a mere
procedural device.7 State v. Childress, 284 S. W. 520 (Mo. App.
1926), recently decided in a jurisdiction following the federal
rule, illustrates this change of attitude toward the rule. In that
case the defendant failed to make the preliminary motion. The
evidence was declared admissible without a single reference to
constitutional rights.8  Thus does safeguarding the Fourth
Amendment and kindred provisions in state constitutions become
dependent upon timely procedural tactics.
But even where the preliminary motion has diligently been filed,
the courts are reluctant to make a general application of the fed-
eral rule. This reluctance is reflected in a growing tendency to
give a liberal construction to already established exceptions to the
rule, and to seize upon the barest technicalities to enforce these
exceptions. For instance, the first ten amendments to the Con-
stitution restrain only federal officers. Federal courts, there-
fore, logically hold that the fruits of an illegal search by state
or municipal officers need not be excluded. 9 But what is a search
controversy over the federal rule. Arguments in favor of the rule are
found in: Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case (1925)
23 MICH. L. REv. 748; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921)
34 HARv. L. REv. 361; Carroll, Search and Seizure Provisions of the Federal
and State Constitutions (1924) 10 VA. L. REv. 124. Arguments against the
rule are expressed in: Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure (1925) 19 ILL. L. Rnv. 303; 4 WIGIORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
2183-2184; (1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 250.
- Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
G See Harno, op. cit. supra note 4, at 312.
7 Cf Atkinson, op. cit. supra note 4, at 753; et seq. Prof. Atkinson gives
a clear exposition of the motion, but he justifies it entirely upon procedural
grounds without considering its relation to the major tenet of the rule.
8 Courts disagree on the importance of the motion. The stronger view is
that unless the motion is made the evidence is admissible. Levin v. United
States, 5 Fed. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; People v. Kerwin, 209 N. W.
157 (Mich. 1926). The contrary holding is that the seizure cannot be
questioned before trial. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W.
860 (1920) . In Tennessee and Illinois the defendant has his choice. State
v. Bass, 281 S. W. 936 (Tenn. 1926); People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143
N. E. 112 (1924). For a discussion of the procedural problems raised by
the development of the motion, see the opinion of Cook, J., in State v.
Bass, supra.
9 Crawford v. United States, 5 Fed. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
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by a state officer? Apparently the fact that federal agents actu-
ally accompany the state officers makes no difference." The ex-
tent to which this exception is used to circumvent the rule is in-
dicated in two recent cases. In Klcin z. United States, 14 Fed.
(2d) 35 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926) the evidence was admitted although
the federal officers were called immediately to the raided house
and carried away the paraphernalia for their own use. In Di'2oV,
v. United States, 12 Fed. (2d) 926 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) the raid
was held to have been made by state officers though the infor-
mation leading up to it was given by federal prohibition agents.
These cases suggest that the courts will be satisfied if it can be
shown that the state officers were the first to cross the threshold
of the raided premises and execute the formality of touching the
articles to be seized. 1
A similar disposition is reflected in the readiness of courts to
find that the defendant consented to the search and in that way
waived his constitutional privilege.' - The ramifications of this
exception are confusing. Many courts go so far as to hold that
mere acquiescence in the demands of the searching officer is con-
duct sufficiently voluntary to prevent any subsequent application
of the federal rule.'3 The conflict is between courts using an un-
30 Crawford v. United States, supra note 9.
" The extent of this exception is, however, the subject of some conflict.
It is difficult to reconcile the cases already cited with Legman v. United
States, 295 Fed. 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924). In United States v. Coztanzo, 13
Fed. (2d) 259 (W. D. N. Y. 1926) a definite agreement bMtwe n federal
and state officers that the latter should raid certain premises was held to
render the evidence inadmissible. Some state courts refuse to follow the
inverse of this exception. They admit evidence of federal oilicero only if
it has been legally seized. State v. Rebasti, 30 Mo. 226, 2G7 S. W. 853
(1924); Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 250 S. W. 839 (1928). It
has been held that a search by a military picket does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, although if made under similar circumstances by a civil officer
it would be illegal. United States v. Crowley, 9 Fed. (2d) 927 (N. D. Ga.
1925). But cf. State v. Ethridge, 135 Wash. 500, 238 Pac. 19 (1925). Mo-A
courts agree that evidence illegally seized by private individuals is admiz-
sible. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921). But ef.
People v. Defore, su'pra note 3, at 23, 150 N. E. at 583: "We e:alt form
above substance when we hold that the use is made lawful because the in-
truder is without a badge of office.
12 Windsor v. United States, 286 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928). "In this
connection several cases turn upon the alleged consent of the party to ba
searched. We think such cases usually strain a point to justify the search."
See State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 358, 259 S. W. 100, 102 (1924).
13 Opening the door of the premises on demand is called consent. Com-
monwealth v. Mleiner, 196 Ky. 840, 245 S. W. S90 (1922). So, also, where
the search is permitted in the belief that it is for sonie non-incriminating
purpose. State v. Roop, 73 Mont. 177, 235 Pac. 336 (1925); Massei v.
United States, 295 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924). Records that are re-
quired to be made under the National Prohibition Act may be taken for use
as evidence in a prosecution under the Act. Guckenheimer v. United Statez,
3 Fed. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) ; Marron v. United States, S Fed. (2d)
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reasonable method to secure a justifiable end and courts insist-
ing upon a logical observance of an impractical rule.
The idea that the constitutional privilege is personal to the
owner of the premises also plays an important part in this modifi-
cation of the federal rule. The illegality of the search is of no
avail to a defendant who is not owner of the premises searched. 14
But here, too, the practice of construing away the general rule
where it ought logically to be applied has produced many con-
flicting holdings.15 In this respect it is proper to consider the
relation of section 25 of the National Prohibition Act to the ob-
servance of the rule. The Act provides that "No search warrant
shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such unless
it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor."
A search of a private dwelling used merely for the unlawful
251 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). Likewise, where the files are required under the
Harrison Narcotic Law. Spring Co. v. United States, 12 Fed. (2d) 852
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926). Evidence secured by tax officials examining the de-
fendant's books has been held admissible in a prosecution for violation of
the Prohibition law. Cooper v. United States, 9 Fed. (2d) 216 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925). Yet othor decisions maintain that mere acquiescence in an
official's demands is not to be construed as consent. Dukes v. United States,
275 Fed. 142 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921) ; States v. Luna, 266 S. W. 755 (Mo. 1924).
In Re Lobosco, 11 Fed. (2d) 892 (E. D. Pa. 1926) is in direct conflict with
Cooper v. United States, supra.
14 Rouda v. United States, 10 Fed. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; Shell v.
Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 264, 246 S. IV. 797 (1923).
15 Evidence secured by an illegal search of the father's farm is admissible
against the son living there. Frye v. State, 151 N. E. 728 (Ind. 1926). But
the husband is protected from a wrongful search of premises owned by his
wife. Sanders v. State, 106 So. 822 (Miss. 1926). The exception is used
to justify the admission of bottles owned by another, but taken from the
automobile of the defendant. Hurwitz v. United States, 299 Fed. 449 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1924); and, on the other hand, the admission of bottles of the de-
fendant taken from the premises of another. State v. Fenley, 305 Mo. 520,
275 S. W. 36 (1925). A jug of liquor wrongfully taken from the buyer may
be used against the seller. State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501, 232 Pac. 321
(1925). That the illegally seized articles were owned by one defendant
is no bar to their use against co-defendants. Brooks v. United States, 8
Fed. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). The courts apparently will minutely
scrutinize the defendant's right to possession. Snedegar v. State, 196 Ind.
254, 146 N. E. 849 (1925). Thus, evidence seized from defendants in pos-
session of an abandoned barn is admissible. Tritico v. United States, 4
Fed. (2d) 664 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925). Ownership must affirmatively be
pleaded. Earle v. State, 194 Ind. 165, 142 N. E. 405 (1924). And having
once disclaimed ownership, the defendant may not later object to the evi-
dence. State v. District Court, 72 Mont. 77, 236 Pac. 257 (1925). The evi-
dence is always admissible if legal title be found to be in the corporation,
as such, rather than in the defendant officers thereof. Guckenheimer v.
United States, supra note 13. It has been held that evidence secured by a
search of the defendant's lands without a warrant is admissible so long as
his house has not been entered. State v. Cobb, 309 Mo. 89, 273 S. W. 736
(1925); Simmons v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 33, 275 S. W. 369 (1925);
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445 (1924).
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manufacture of liquor is, therefore, not permitted and evidence
secured in such a search should, under the federal rule, be sup-
pressed.16
A search otherwise illegal is in many cases justified on the
ground that an offense was being committed in the presence of
the officer.17 A comparison of the cases on this point shows that
the courts are not agreed on what constitutes "in the presence
of an officer." But it is apparently the practice to settle the
doubt by admitting the evidence.1s Where the search is incidental
to an arrest, similar questions on the legality of arrest and the
extent to which the search is to be permitted arise.10 It has also
been said that the federal rule will operate to exclude neither
the so-called corpus delicti of a crime,0 nor that which by statute
is declared contraband.21 Furthermore, the use of evidence -ill
not be barred because of any technical defect in the search war-
rant.2 2 In some states the warrant need be valid only on its face,
26 Bell v. United States, 9 Fed. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). The pro-
tection thus afforded by section 25 has been said to e-x-tend to a garage at-
tached to the house. Temperani v. United States, 299 Fed. 305 (C. C. A.
9th, 1924). But cf. Earl v. United States, 4 Fed. (2d) 532 (C. C. A. th,
1925) (where a search of a garage in the basement of the dwelling vas held
legal). Does the mere fact that someone sleeps in the building render it
immune from search? The recent decision of Schroeder v. United States,
14 Fed. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) reaches that conclusion but it is in
conflict with United States v. Mitchell, 12 Fed. (2d) 83 (D. Tex%. 1926)
and also Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498, 45 Sup. Ct. 414 (1925).
The dissenting opinion of Judge Gilbert in the Schroeder case, ,pra, ex-
presses an intelligent view of the scope of section 25. Evidence seized under
a city ordinance permitting the search of a house where liquor is manu-
factured is admissible in a federal court notwithstanding section 25. United
States v. Viess, 273 Fed. 279 (W. D. Wash. 1921).
17 MHcFADDEN, THE LAw op PROEIBITION (1925) 28, 29.
1s United States v. Gaitan, 4 Fed. (2d) 848 (S. D. Calif. 1925); "iland
v. United States, 296 Fed. 629 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Nicholson v. United
States, 6 Fed. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925). The past criminal record
of the defendant was, in Jones v. United States, 290 Fed. 632 (C. C. A.
4th, 1924) held to justify the search. But for a decision limiting the ex-
ception, see Brock v. United States, 12 Fed. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920).
Greater confusion edsts among state courts. Compare People v. Dungey,
209 N. W. 57 (Mich. 1926) with Boyd v. State, 152 N. E. 278 (Ind. 192G);
and People v. Mushlock, 207 N. W. 834 (Mich. 1926) with Testolin v. State,
188 Wis. 275, 205 N. W. 825 (1925).
39 It is sufficient to refer to (1926) 35 YALn LAW Jou;,xL, 612, vhich
considers this phase of the general subject.
20 United States v. Welsh, 247 Fed. 239 (S. . N. Y. 1917); Fenton v.
United States, 268 Fed. 221 (D. Mont. 1920). Contra: United States v.
Kelih, 272 Fed. 484 (S. D. I1. 1921).
21State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501, 232 Pac. 321 (1925); cf. lozanci v.
State, 106 Ohio St. 442, 140 N. E. 370 (1922); State v. Martin, 235 S. W.
777 (Mo. 1926); CORNELIUS, SEARCHES AND SEMu=rS (1920) 47-49. But cf.
State v. Owens, su:pra note 12.22 Rothlisberger v. United States, 289 Fed. 72 (C. C. A. 0th, 1923) (where
the wrong street number was given, and the person named was not the
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and the truth of the affidavits cannot be attacked.2 3 Even though
the officers contrary to law destroy part of the liquor seized,
their testimony is nevertheless admissible.24
The Supreme Court definitely contributed to this tendency to
modify the federal rule by holding that the Fourth Amendment
was not to be extended beyond the literal scope it was by its fram-
ers intended to have.25 An excuse was in that way found for dis-
carding the rule in many situations of prohibition enforcement.
The foregoing instances of limitations placed upon the federal
rule suggest several conclusions. The generalization in the Boyd
case has been found incompatible with prohibition enforcement.
In an attempt to adapt it to the new conditions courts have lost
sight of its function as a constitutional safeguard. The rule has
become merely a technicality in procedure. -But even in that field
it has been necessary to curb its operation. So frequently are
courts shaping exceptions to the rule, so rapidly is an unwieldy
mass of precedent growing, that an exact definition of the rule
no longer is possible. The original federal rule against illegally
seized evidence has been broken down; confusion and uncertainty
remain.
RECIPROCITY AND THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
In actions concerning foreign judgments it has been commonly
said that a sister-state money judgment is conclusive evidence of
a cause of action, but a foreign money judgment is merely "prima
facie" evidence.: "Conclusive" seems to mean "conclusive as to
the merits"; it does not refer to questions of lack of jurisdiction 2
owner of the premises); Golden v. United States, 4 Fed. (2d) 846 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925) (failure to make proper return of the warrant).
23 Smee v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 488, 251 S. W. 622 (1923). Evidence
is not disqualified because the warrant is unaccompanied by affidavits when
introduced at trial. Terrell v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 288, 244 S. W. 703
(1922). Nor because the warrant has been lost. State v. Price, 274 S. W.
500 (Mo. App. 1925).
24Hurley v. United States, 300 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924). Contra:
United States v. Cooper, 295 Fed. 709 (D. Mass. 1924). The Cooper case
is disapproved of in In Re Quirk, 1 Fed. (2d) 484 (W. D. N. Y. 1924).
25 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280 (1924).
See Burnham v. Webster, Fed. Cas. No. 2179 (C. C. Me. 1846); Bimeler
v. Dawson, 5 Ill. 536, 540 (1843); Warren v. Flagg, 2 Pick. 448, 449, 450
(Mass. 1824); Robinson v. Prescott, 4 N. H. 450, 453, 454 (1828); Hitch-
cock v. Aicken, 1 Caines, 460, 463, 464 (N. Y. 1803); Pelton v. Platner, 13
Ohio, 209, 217 (1844); Eastern Townships Bank v. Beebe, 53 Vt. 177, 182
(1880); ef. Betts v. Death, Addis. 265, 266 (Pa. 1795).
2 Ferguson v. Oliver, 99 Mich. 161 (1894); Tremblay v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 Atl. 509 (1903) ; Middlesex Bank v. Butman, 29 Me. 19
(1848) ; Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N. Y. 149, 103 N. E. 1113 (1913) ; Boyle
v. Semenoff, 201 App. Div. 426, 194 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dept. 1922);
Traders Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 478, 178 N. W. 735 (1920);
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or of fraud in obtaining the judgment,3 either of which is ground
for impeaching the judgment.4 The meaning of "prima facie,"
however, seems obscure. The earlier English cases may be in-
terpreted as indicating that a foreign judgment can be reviewed
on the merits, that is, tried anew on all points.3 But some of the
earlier American cases seem to have meant no more than that the
judgment could be impeached for fraud or lack of jurisdictionP
This makes "prima facie" and "conclusive" mean the same
thing.7 Leaving cases involving reciprocity aside for the mo-
ment, American decisions have, with the exception of one doubt-
ful case,8 given only two grounds for reviewing foreign judg-
Roussillon v. Roussillon, 14 Ch. D. 351 (1880); Phillips v. Bathe [1913]
3 K. B. 25; Duflos v. Burlingham, 34 L. T. 688 (Q. B. 1S76); see Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 203, 204, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 153, 159 (1895); Fesva,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1925) 598-03. For foreign dcfault
judgments, see Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714 (195); Ouseley
v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., S4 Fed. 602 (C. C. Pa. 1897); Christian &
Craft Grocery Co. v. Coleman, 125 Ala. 158, 27 So. 786 (1900). For view
contra see Hammersley, J., dissenting in Fisher v. Fielding, -vpra, citing
The Delta, L. R. 1 P. D. 393 (176). Cf., however, Schibzby v. Westen-
holz, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155, 160, 161 (1870).
3 Wrhat is fraud in obtaining a foreign country's judgment is not defi-
nitely settled. An alternate ground of the decision in Tremblay v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., svpra note 2, apparently accords with the English view as
represented by Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, infra note 12. Cases as to siter
state judgments are plentiful. Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156 (1851);
Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N. Y. 348, 60 N. E. 663 (1901); Ann.
Cas. 1914 D, 999 if. These are chiefly eases of fraud where jurisdiction was
obtained through fraud. See 3 FnIEraLAN, JUDGMn ES (5th ed. 1925) § 1401;
(1911) 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 913-917. The English rule as to fraud io lihewise
uncertain. See infra note 11; Hilton v. Guyot, smtpra note 2, at 206, 207, 16
Sup. Ct. at 160.
4 The same is apparently true as to penal judgments. See Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 289, 290, 8 Sup. CL 137"0, 1g74 (1803);
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 670-633, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 229-233
(1892) ; Huntington v. Attrill [1893] A. C. 150, 155, 156; Folliott v. Ogden,
1 H. BI. 123, 135 (C. P. 1789). Cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 2'30, 28
Sup. Ct. 641 (1908). And it is true as to judgments not final in their
nature. American Nat'l Bank v. Garland, 235 S. W. 562 (Tex. Comm. App.
1921); cf. Janous v. Columbus State Bank, 101 Neb. 393, 164 N. W. 1053
(1917) ; Harrop v. Harrop [1920] 3 K. B. 386; cf. Beatty v. Beatty [1921]
1 K. B. 807.
5 Sinclair v. Fraser, 1 Doug. 4 n. (H. L. 1771) ; Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug.
1, 5 (K. B. 1778); Phillips v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 402 (C. P. 1795); Houl-
ditch v. Donegal, 8 Bligh (N. S.) 301 (1834). Except perhaps for the last
case cited, none of these is authority for reviewing a foreign judgment on
the merits. There apparently was such review, however, in Otway v. rani-
sey, 2 Stra. 1090 (K. B. 1736) and in a very early case cited by Kuhn, Doc-
trines of English and American Private Intenzationa! Law Cont rsted with
Those in Continental Europe (1912) 12 COL. L. REV. 44, 46: Y. B. 2 Ed. II
(1 S. S.) 111. See FOOTE, op. cit. svpra note 2, at 617-021.
rButtrick v. Allen, 8 Blass. 273 (1811) ; Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157,
169 (N.Y. 1808).
Except, of course, as to merger. See infra note 14.
sBurnham v. Webster, supra note 1. See infra note 10.
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ments in addition to those recognized for reviewing sister-state
judgments: (a) that there has been an unfair trial," (b) that the
suit is on a cause of action unknown in the forum and against
the public policy of the forum.10 Two other grounds are sug-
9 Bank of Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S. W. 711 (1915). In this
case a Mexican judgment was denied recognition because the technicalities
of Mexican procedure had prevented the defendant there from setting up
a good defense and the omission to affix a stamp to the document of appeal
had deprived him of his right to appeal. The case cites no authority and
is believed to be the first direct decision in this country on the point. Ac-
cord: Brussels Conference draft (1925) Article 2(a), reported in Wigmore,
Execution of Foreign Judgments (1926) 21 ILL. L. Rsv. 1, 4.
20 De Brimont v. Penniman, Fed. Cas. No. 3,715 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1876).
This case holds that suit cannot be maintained on a French judgment for
support of a son-in-law. It, also, seems a first impression case. Cf. In re
Macartney [1921] 1 Ch. 522 (Maltese decree that father support bastard
child) ; Robinson v. Fenner [1913] 3 K. B. 835 (one ground of the decision
is in accord). The Hague Conference draft (1925). Article 1(2) reported
in KOSTERS, LA CINQUI E CONFPRgNCE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 3RIVL'
(1926) 45, 46, establishes as a condition to recognition of a foreign judg-
ment "that the recognition of the decision be not contrary to public order
or to the principles of law of.the State where its enforcement is sought."
See also article 2(b) of the Brussels Conference draft, supra note 9,
. .. against the public policy of the State in which its enforcement is
sought." And section 2 of the Stockholm Conference (1924) INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AsSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-THIRD CONFERENCE (1925)
146, 148, "contra bonos mores."
A case out of line with the general trend is Burnham v. Webster, supra
note 1. Here there was judgment for the plaintiff in New Brunswick on a
number of notes. But as to one of them there was judgment for the
defendant (that he "go without day") with no verdict as to it, and an
alleged agreement that there should be no action on it. Under such cir-
cumstances the plaintiff was allowed to bring an action on the note in the
United States. MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry., 71 N. H. 448, 52 Atl. 982
(1902). is a stronger case involving a similar question of res adjudicata.
In England the "prima facie" doctrine has never been considered in connec-
tion with res adjudicata. Ricardo v. Garcias, 12 Cl. & F. 368 (H. L. 1845) ;
Barber v. Lamb, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 95 (1860); BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed.
1913) 342. But there seems to be no reason for distinguishing res adjudicata
from enforcement, for all other cases on enforcement of foreign judgments
(still excepting those involving reciprocity) have held them conclusive in
the absence of fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y.
146 (1862); Baker v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568 (1876); Rankin v. Goddard, 54
Me. 28 (1866) (query, whether "fraud" as used in this case means fraud in
obtaining the judgment); Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235, 16 Sup, Ct.
171 (1895); Christian & Craft Grocery Co. v. Coleman, supra note 2; of.
Strauss v. Conried, 121 Fed. 199 (C. C. N. Y. 1902); Gioe v. Westervelt,
116 Fed. 1017 (C. C. N. Y. 1902); Ouseley v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.,
supra note 2; see Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 500, 501 (1853) ; Boston
India Rubber Factory v. Holt, 14 Vt. 92, 94 (1842); Alberta Lumber Co.
v. Pioneer Lumber Co., 244 Pac. 250, 251 (Wash. 1926). Anderson v. Had-
don, 33 Hun, 435 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1884) purports to follow De Brimont v.
Penniman, but the decision probably turns on lack of jurisdiction.
It appears, therefore, that except for cases under the reciprocity doctrine,
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gested in English cases: (a) that the foreign court has rendered a
judgment refusing to recognize any rule of private international
law almost universally recognized; 21 (b) that there has been
fraud.12 Whether these grounds will be adopted by the Ameri-
can courts is, of course, a matter for the future to decide. As
"prima facie evidence" indicates the possibility of a review on
the merits, and as the difference between the recognition of
foreign-country and sister-state judgments has ordinarily been
so slight, the expression seems unfortunate in this application.23
It is, however, appropriate when dealing with non-merger " and
reciprocity.
only three cases have actually reviewed foreign country judgments on
grounds other than those which allow a review of sister-state judgments.
11 Simpson v. Fogo, 1 H. & M. (Ch. 1862). Here an English court refused
to give effect to a Louisiana judgment which had refused to recognize the
title of a mortgagee of an English ship under the English law. None of
the three conventions mentioned supra note 10 has adopted this rule in its
tentative draft.
12 Le., fraud generally-not confined to fraud in obtaining the judgment.
Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, 10 Q. B. D. 295 (1882); Vadala v. Lawes, 25
Q. B. D. 310 (1890); Manger v. Cash, 5 T. L. R. 271 (Q. B. 1839); FOOTE,
op. cit. supra, note 2, at 603-605. Whether or not this is still English law
is doubtful. Bank of Australasia v. Nias, L. R. 16 Q. B. 717 (1851); Rob-
inson v. Fenner, supra note 10; 1 PIGGOrr, FOREIGN JUD GENTS (3d ed.
1908) 387, 395; FREEAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1483. It is perhaps
significant that the cases holding it is not still English law deal with judg-
ments obtained in colonies.
It seems fairly well settled that sister-state judgments are impeachable
only for fraud in obtaining the judgment. See citations supra note 3.
13Story was, more than anyone else, influential in bringing about the
present tendency to recognize foreign judgments where possible. He bitterly
criticized the vague use of "prima facie": "the rule, that the judgment is
to be prima, facie evidence for the plaintiff, would be a mere delusion, if
the defendant might still question it by opening all or any of the original
merits on his side; for under such circumstances it would be equivalent to
granting a new trial.' STORY, CoNFLICT Or LAWs (6th ed. 1805) § 607.
Wigmore points out that a judgment when enforced is not treated as
evidence; rather it is lending the court's executive aid, on certain terms,
without investigation of the merits of fact. 2 WIGMioIE, EUENCE (2d ed.
1923) 1019.
24 When a sister-state judgment has been obtained, action can only be
brought on the judgment itself, but when a foreign judgment has been
rendered, action may be brought on either the judgment or on the original
cause of action. Swift v. David, 181 Fed. 828 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910); Long
v. Peters Mill Co., 157 La. 283, 102 So. 402 (1924); 3 Fr -ui, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 1502; (1925) 34 YALE LAw JOTUNAL, 550; 1 PIGGOT, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 17, 13. The theory apparently is not applied to ca~c3 in
which the foreign judgment for the defendant is set up as a bar. Cf.
MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Line, supra note 10; Ricardo v. Garcias, nupria
note 10; Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Tranatlantique (cited iafra in
the text). It is peculiar to American and English jurisprudence, the
typical procedure being the obtaining of an ccq2tp-*. See Lorenzen, Eu-
forcement of American Judgntnts Abroad (1919) 29 Y,=n IAw JOurN-AL,
188, 192. Of course to say that a foreign judgment is prima facie evidence
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In 1895 it was held that in an action on a judgment of a
foreign country, the judgment would be reviewed on the merits
unless that country recognized our judgments." This doctrine
of reciprocity was strictly limited by dictum to actions brought
on foreign judgments against United States defendants."
-with the only reason that of non-merger would be inaccurate in the cases
under discussion, since they involve actions on the judgment itself or res
adjudicata.
25 Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 2.
16 Ibid. at 170, 15 Sup. Ct. at 146. It is possible that those judgments are
limited to those secured by foreigners in foreigners' courts. On the basis
of the rules postulated in Hilton v. Guyot and the few cases on the subject,
the following classification may be made as to the treatment to be accorded
judgments of foreign countries which do not recognize our judgments as
tonclusive:
1(a). Foreign plaintiff and United States defendant-judgment for
plaintiff in the foreign country; reciprocity will be applied. This was the
actual holding in Hilton v. Guyot. Until 1926 it had not been followed by
any case in which a judgment of a nation which did not recognize our
judgments was involved. It was given lip service, however, in three cases
involving nations which recognize our judgments: Cruz v. O'Boyle, 107
Fed. 824 (D. C. Pa. 1912); Strauss v. Conried, supra note 10; Glee V.
Westervelt, supra note 10 (counterclaim). Cf. Traders Trust Co. v. David-
son, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N. W. 735 (1920) (action on Manitoba judgment
in which there had been no jurisdiction over the defendant; court notes
"in passing" that Hilton v. Guyot could apply). Of. Fisher v. Fielding,
supra note 2, at 108, 34 Atl. at 716.
1(b). Foreign plaintiff and United States defendant-judgment for the
defendant in the foreign country; reciprocity will not be applied (the judg-
ment will be held conclusive). Again, this rule has had no direct following
until 1926. In MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry., supra note 10, the Canadian
court which gave judgment for the defendant was one which gave recogni-
tion to our judgments.
2 (a). United States plaintiff and foreign defendant-judgment for plain-
tiff in the foreign 6ountry; reciprocity will not be applied. No cases have
been found on this point. Presumably the reasoning behind 1(b) and 2(a)
is that, since recognition or non-recognition of foreign judgment as con-
clusive is purely a matter of comity, there is no reason to question a
foreign adjudication with consequent possible benefit to a foreigner, who
should be content with his or another country's adjudications, and detriment
to a United States citizen.
2(b). United States plaintiff and foreign defendant-judgment for the
defendant in tha foreign country; reciprocity will not be applied. The
theory stated to substantiate this is that he who invokes the jurisdiction
should be bound by a judgment against him. See Cammell v. Sewell, 3 II.
& N. 617, 646 (Exch. 1858).
3. Foreign plaintiff and foreign defendant, judgment for either in the
foreign country; here it would seem that the reasons for 2(a) and (b)
would apply.
Hilton v. Guyot does not mention a fourth class:
4(a). United States plaintiff and defendant, judgment for plaintiff in
the foreign country. On analogy to 1(a) reciprocity would be applied; on
analogy to 2(a) it would not be. We are given no intimation of which
would be followed.
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Whether there is such a limitation and whether there should be
such a doctrine in New York, were questions raised by two
recent cases. In Johnston v,. Com pagizie Gj v'ale Tra-z&at1/u-
tique, 242 N. Y. 881, 152 N. E. 121 (1926) there was judgment
for the defendant (a French corporation) in France. The plain-
tiff of the French action (an American citizen) sought to get a
judgment in New York on the same cause of action. The court
refused to go into the merits and gave judgment for the defen-
dant. This case may be interpreted (a) as confirming the limi-
tation suggested by Hilton v. Guyot upon the doctrine of reci-
procity to actions on foreign judgments ' or (b) as standing for
the entire abolition of the doctrine in New York. '  In the sub-
sequent case of Cowens v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 127
Mlisc. 898, 217 N. Y. Supp. 647 (Sup. Ct. 1926) a lower New York
court rendered a decision which, if affirmed, will necessarily
limit the effect of the Johizston case to (a)."
Reciprocity has been bitterly criticized., The criticism gen-
erally takes the form of comparing it disadvantageously with a
theory of universal recognition of foreign judgments.
There are three main arguments for universal recognition.
The first is that a judgment is a law governing private rights,
and that it should be recognized as is foreign contract or property
4(b). United States plaintiff and defcndant, judg9nimnt for deftndant in
the foreign country. Analogy to 1(b) and 2(b) indicate reciprocity vould
not be applied.
A modern divorce case affirming by way of dictum the rcciprocity doctrine
of Hilton v. Guyot in dictum is Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 7G4, 75 So. 35
(1917).
7Le., as being the first case to arise under 2(b) (s'pra note 16).
is Both grounds were given in the opinion.
15 In this case the plaintiffs, citizens of Quebec, brought action against the
defendant, a New York corporation, in Quebec. There was judgment for
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs now bring action on the judgment in New
York. Held, that since Quebec does not regard our judgments as final,
this judgment will not be so regarded, and the plaintiff is not entitled to
judgment on the pleadings; the defendant may plead any defense which he
might have pleaded in the original action.
This, then, is the first case since Hilton v. Guyot to arise under 1(a)
(supra note 16).
20 Learned Hand, J., in Disconto Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp.,
300 Fed. 741, 747 (S. D. N. Y. 1924): "So far as I Inow, the doctrine of
reciprocity has been confined to foreign judgments alone, and has no appli-
cation to situations of this sort" [referring to the question whether the
Federal court should hold invalid a title derived in English seizure under
the Trading with the Enemy Act, when England might not recognize title
derived from similar seizure by us]. ". . . That doctrine, I am happy
to say, is not part of American jurisprudence." See (1925) 38 HARvm L.
REV. 683; (1925) 34 YALE LAW JounAL, 549; (1920) 20 CoL. L. R r. 892;
(1926) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 62; (1926) 25 MICH. L. RV. 70, all approving the
Johnston case's purported repudiation of reciprocity. The reciprocity
theory is popular on the continent. See Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 2, at
210 if., 15 Sup. Ct. at 161 if., and Lorenzen, op. cit. unpra note 14, 199 f.
547
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law.21  The second is that trade is thereby facilitated.22 The
third is that much unnecessary litigation will thereby be pre-
vented.23  If it can be said that judgments of foreign countries
are as well considered as are ours, and that their policies are not
definitely in conflict with ours, these arguments seem convincing.
These assumptions can not be called violent when we are dealing
with countries such as France and England. Consequently it is
better to take a chance on such judgments being correct than
suspiciously to examine every one on the merits (au fond). On
the other hand, universal recognition hardly seems advisable.
The judgments of some of the smaller countries are so notor-
iously ill-considered that some sort of examination would seem
to be the only way of doing justice.24 We seek, then, a rule re-
quiring as full recognition to be given to judgments rendered by
reputable foreign courts as is given to domestic judgments, but
permitting a more extensive examination of other countries'
judgments. Does reciprocity help us thus to distinguish the
wheat from the chaff? 2 5  Obviously it does not. The quality
of a court does not depend upon the particular theory it may have
as to recognition of our judgments-therein lies reciprocity's
salient defect. There being no diplomatic necessity for a system
of reprisals, the theory seems entirely without merit.20 It would
seem far better policy to adopt a theory of universal recognition,
and to trust to the discretion of judges to eye with suspicion the
judgments of inferior countries, at the same time giving almost
unqualified approbation to those of other countries. Such dis-
21 See periodicals cited supra note 20. Foreign writers justify the dis-
tinction between foreign "law" and judgments on the ground that a judg-
ment, involving as it does the variable personality of judges, should not be
classed for this purpose as "law." 2 PILLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVhI
(1924) 508, 509, 663.
22 See periodicals cited supra note 20.
23 Ibid.
A fourth argument has been suggested: the difficulty in getting the evi-
dence before the second country's court. See 38 HARv. L. REV., supra note
20. Also the difficulty in predicting unfairness on a procedure differing
from ours. Of. Cottingham's Case, 2 Swans, *326 n (H. L. 1078).
24 Fraud in the judgment, lack of jurisdiction, etc., as now applied can
hardly be considered sufficient checks, in view of the difficulties involved in
getting evidence of the trial.
25 Reciprocity has generally been attacked on the ground that it is a
political theory; its introduction by the courts therefore improper. See
periodicals cited supra note 20. Such criticism does not, of course, attack
its worth per se as a workable theory.
26 See BAR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gillespie's transl. 2d ed. 1892)
97. Even assuming that reciprocity's function of separating the wheat
from the chaff is well done, the theory is likely to lead to almost universal
non-recognition due to differing modes of enforcing of judgments, differing
grounds for impeachment, unfamiliarity with foreign law, etc. Lorenzen,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 201-207.
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cretion could be exercised by giving an elastic meaning to "un-
fair trial." 27 The defect in this theory is its dependence on
individual judges and consequent uncertainty. The solution of
the problem appears to be this: The question should be dealt
with politically, i.e., by treaties. In this way the various nations
could be classified intelligently; certainty is assured. This
method has already been adopted (to a limited extent) by France
and a few other countries,2 5- and it is to be hoped will gain in
favor as a result of international conferences.2-
THE EFFECT OF PLEADING ON JURISDICTION
"One of the most difficult and one of the most permanent prob-
lems which a legal system must face is a combination of a due
regard for the claims of substantial justice with a system of
procedure rigid enough to be workable. It is easy to favour one
quality at the expense of the other with the result that either
all system is lost or there is so elaborate and technical a system
that the decision of cases turns almost entirely upon the working
of its rules and only occasionally and incidentally upon the merits
of the cases themselves." " This difficulty of working out a pro-
cedural path which will be workable and yet flexible was illus-
trated in the recent case of New Ha,en Sand Blast Co. r. Di'ts-
bach, 104 Conn. 322, 133 Atl. 99 (1926). The plaintiff made a
motion in the Superior Court to extend a judgment 2 heretofore
27 See supra note 9.
25 Cited in Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 14, at 194 n. Cf. the rcccnt
treaties cited in KosTRsus, op. cit. s2?pra note 10, 37, 38, .14: Italy and
Jugoslavia (1922); Italy and Austria (1922); Netherlands and Belgium
(1925).
29The matter of enforcement of foreign judgments has been considered
at Buffalo (1899), Rouen (1900) and Glasgow (1901). There have since
been recent important conferences at Stocldolm (1924), Bruszels (1925)
and The Hague (1925). See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCTIo:, RFlronr o
THE THmTY-THIRD CoxrEaRcNc, sv pa note 10, at 14G-222; ,IGnoyo-, loc.
cit. supra note 9; KosTERs, op. cit. svpra note 10, at 34--46. In the Bruzsels
Congress of 1925, the International Chamber of Commerce rezolved "to
recommend that the various Governments consider the possibility of adopt-
ing agreements on the basis of reciprocity between States vhere there exdsts
an affinity of language and legislation, and that an International Conference
be convened later by the League of Nations for the establishment of a
uniform Convention blending the various separate agreements already con-
cluded by groups of States, or between two States." Wigmore, loc. cit.
supra note 9. The wholesale repudiation of reciprocity urged in the Stock-
holm Conference of 1924 (cited in 12 Coax L. Q., supra note 20, at 65) has
not been urged since and it is to be feared will not be in the future. See
Wigmore, op. cit. supra, at 7. As an international matter the treaty system
argued for in the text seems the only measure which may have effect.
L 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 251.
2 In the former action, the plaintiff, a manufacturer of sand blast barrels,
sought to compel the defendant, who had been its president and general
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obtained between the same parties, alleging facts not already on
the record. No answer or other pleading was filed; but a judg-
ment was rendered for the defendant which recited "that the
parties stipulated in open court that the matter might be heard
by oral argument, as on demurrer, admitting for the purpose of
argument the allegations of fact contained in the motion and
amendment, but questioning the legal sufficiency of the facts so
alleged, and the parties were thus at issue." 3 It was held on
appeal that the judgment be reversed on the ground (1) that a
motion to extend a judgment which required, in order to estab-
lish a right to the relief sought, proof of facts extraneous to the
record, was an improper method of bringing to the attention
of the court matters properly the subject of a new and inde-
pendent action; and (2) conceding the procedure by motion to
have been regular, that the oral demurrer was a "jurisdictional
defect" and the court had no power to render a judgment.
A discussion of the necessity of proper written pleadings and
the consequences of a defect in this particular on jurisdiction
requires two distinctions in each case. On the one hand, the
term "jurisdictional defect" is often used indiscriminately to
describe a defect in the pleadings which will prompt a court tq
reverse a judgment on direct attack, or a defect in the pleadings
which will subject a judgment to collateral attack. 4 This am-
biguous use often misleads. The problems in each situation are
not the same. On the other hand, it is equally important to
distinguish the kind of defect. A defect may consist in the mode
of presenting facts to the court, such as an oral pleading, or in
the improper use of a motion to originate an action. Or it may
be that facts sufficient to support the judgment were not pleaded
or litigated. For our purposes, defects in the formal present-
ment of facts, rather than any failure in the facts to support the
court's decision, are important.
Looldng at the cases first from the point of view of direct
attack, th6 types of defect are various. Thus, where no com-
plaint or bill has been filed, a judgment is very generally re-
versed.- The court does not act on its own initiative and the
manager, to turn over to it his rights in a new invention relating to sand
blast barrels, claiming a constructive trust by reason of his confidential
relationship, and also an agreement to assign such rights. A decree was
made ordering the defendant ". . . to fully transfer and insure to the
plaintiff all rights in the so-called Washburn and Sheldon invention." The
present motion prayed the court to issue an order under this decree direct-
ing the defendant to assign the British and Canadian patent rights to the
same invention.
3 At 325-6, 133 Atl. at 100.
4 See L. R. A. 1916E, 316, at 326.
5 Beckett v. Cuenin, 15 Colo. 281, 25 Pac. 167 (1890); Orchard v. Ex-
change Bank, 121 Mo. App. 338, 98 S. W. 824 (1906); Rhodes v. Sewell,
109 So. 179 (Ala. App. 1926); Seymour v. Day, 207 Ala. 60, 91 So. 875
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inception of an action, to be valid on appeal, requires a formal
invocation2 Similarly, affirmative relief in favor of a defendant
who had not demanded it by counterclaim, or other prescribed
mode, is a fatal irregularity.7 A judgment beyond the relief
demanded is "void" for want of "jurisdiction" in spite of an
agreement between the parties to extend the issues. Some
courts invalidate a judgment where there is a failure to plead a
fact necessary to a cause of action even though the fact was
proved at the trial or admitted." In West Virginia, a failure by
the plaintiff to join issue after the defendant has answered
specially to the complaint, renders a judgment based on the alle-
gations of the complaint subject to reversal.- In so far as these
cases declare irregular, on direct attack, a failure to present
properly the facts which are before the court, they indicate an
adherence to the doctrine that formal pleadings under our
judicial sysfem are necessary and convenient, and parties who
omit them are penalized by a reversal of the judgment. The
functional basis and necessity for formal pleadings will be dis-
cussed later on. The important consideration here is that,
assuming formal pleadings to be desirable, the reversal of a judg-
ment on appeal for lack of a complaint, or defect, or omission of
a pleading, is a justifiable method of maintaining the rigidity of
(1921). Contra: Leach v. Western N. C. Ri. R., 65 N. C. 486 (1S71);
Vider v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. App. 595 (1895). Where pleadings Vwcre
destroyed by a fire, a judgment entered thereafter, without proper statutory
substitution was held erroneous. Puckett v. Morris, 181 Ky. "74, 200 S. W.
157 (1918); cf. Grimison v. Russell, 11 Neb. 469 (18S1) (lost pleadings).
Contra: Blades v. Des Moines City Ry., 14G Iowa,'5S0, 12" N. W. 1057
(1909).
6 "For jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something
more than the constitutional or statutory power to entertain case3 of the
general class to which the one in hand belongs: it is that power called into ac-
tivity not by the court of its own motion for that vould ordinarily be insuf-
ficient, but by some act of the suitor concerned and in someN way rccognizcd by
law." FREEML-, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § J38.
7 Schaefer v. Dinwiddie, 44 Calif. App. 405, 18G Pac. 617 (1919) ; Wezt v.
Shurtliff, 28 Utah, 337, 79 Pac. 180 (1904); cf. Title Ins. Co. v. North-
western Title Co., 88 Or. 666, 173 Pac. 251 (1918); Alywin v. Morley, 41
Mont. 191, 108 Pac. 778 (1910).
s Marshall v. Reddick, 177 S. W. 381 (Mo. 1915) (suit for injunction
against trespass, converted by agreement into a suit to quiet title; judg-
ment settling title held erroneous).
9 Moore v. Jones, 273 S. W. 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Modern Woodmen
of America v. Yanowsky, 187 S. W. 728 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); San Antonio
Traction Co. v. Yost, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 551, 88 S. W. 428 (1905).
20 Del-Carbo Coal Co. v. Cunninghame, 93 W. Va. 12, 116 S. E. 719
(1923) ; Shires v. Boggess, 68 W. Va. 137, 69 S. E. 466 (1910) ; McCoy v.
Price, 91 W. Va. 10, 112 S. E. 186 (1922). Ace: Chopin v. Freeman, 145
La. 972, 83 So. 210 (1919) ; Teasdale & Co. v. Manchester Produce Co., 101
Tenn. 267, 56 S. W. 853 (1900).
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the procedural system, even though we may quarrel with the
extent to which some courts preserve this rigidity.
But to declare that a judgment is void because of a "jurisdic-
tional defect" in the pleadings so as to be subject to collateral
attack seems to go deeper than the mere desire to preserve the
rigidity of procedural working rules. Since some courts realize
this, and others do not,"' we have a contrariety of opinion on the
validity of such judgments where the attack is made collaterally.
In the leading case of Reynolds v. Stockton,1 the New Jersey
court was not required to give full faith and credit to a personal
judgment rendered in New York against the defendant, where
the complaint merely demanded a fund in the custody of the
state insurance superintendent, who was also a party defendant,
on the ground that the judgment was not responsive to the issues.
Carried to an extreme, this decision would seem to allow col-
lateral attack in any case where there is a failure in the plead-
ings to state a cause of action; but nearly all jurisdictions refuse
to support a collateral attack for insufficiency of the complaint,
even though the insufficiency is apparent on the face of the
pleadings. 13 The Reynolds case is understandable, however,
when all the facts appear. It seems that the defendant, although
he had filed a pleading, did not appear in court to litigate the
question; and the real ground of the decision is that he had not
been given an opportunity to be heard on the issue which predi-
cated the judgment. Thus, Mr. Justice Brewer remarked, "Nor
are we concerned with the question as to the rule which obtains
in a case in which, while the matter determined was not, in fact,
put in issue by the pleadings, it is apparent from the record that
the defeated party was present at the trial and actually litigated
that matter." 14 This statement hits directly what should be the
11 See, for example, the extreme case of Jordon v. Brown, 71 Iowa, 421,
32 N. W. 450 (1887) where a judgment was held void on collateral attack
because the caption of the petition was addressed to the wrong court.
12 140 U. S. 254, 11 Sup. Ct. 773 (1890).
1Jarrel v. Laurel Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 752, 84 S. E. 933 (1915); Tube
City Mining Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 Pac. 203 (1915); L. R. A.
1916 E, 316, note; Berry v. King, 15 Or. 165, 13 Pac. 772 (1887) (default
judgment); Palmer v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 77 N. J. L. 143, 71
Atl. 285 (1908) (where it appeared on the face that the cause of action was
barred by the statute of limitations).
This is not true in the case of a special proceeding where the jurisdic-
tional facts must appear on the face of the petition. Miller v. Thompson,
209 Ala. 469, 96 So. 481 (1923) ; cf. In re Jacobson's Will, 44 S. D. 409, 184
N. W. 237 (1921) (failure to file a petition); see Stockyard Nat'l Bank v.
Bragg, 245 Pac. 966, 973 (Utah, 1925).
'1 Compare Munday v. Vail, 34 N. J. L. 418, 423 (1871) cited in Reynolds
v. Stockton, 140 U. S. at 268, 11 Sup. Ct. at 776, stating that "A judgment
upon a matter outside the issue must of necessity be altogether arbitrary
and unjust, as it concludes a point upon which the parties have not been
heard. And it is upon this very ground that the parties have been heard,
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guide in these cases. Total omission of pleadings, formal defects
in pleadings, or even failure to state a cause of action should be
disregarded in collateral proceedings if it appears from aiy P'7wt
of the record that the parties have been heard, or have been given
an opportunity to be heard, as to the facts in controversy between
them.15  Of course, the phrase "opportunity to be heard" may be
interpreted broadly or narrowly. It is intended here to refer to
a judgment taken in default of pleading or of appearance at the
trial or, if there has been a trial, a judgment beyond the actual
facts litigated or consented to by the parties. In case of trial
there has been an "opportunity to be heard" only with respect
to the facts on the record; 11 in case of default, only with respect
to the allegations of the complaint and the relief demanded. It
would be unfortunate, if, for example, on a plaintiff's claim for
damages for trespass to land, a valid judgment by default de-
termining the title to the land could be rendered.
With this background of "jurisdictional defects" on direct at-
tack and on collateral attack, how should we deal with a defect
in a pleading which consists in the use of a "motion" instead of
a complaint to invoke the maclinery of the court? At common
law, pleading was a process of affirmation and denial, aiming at
a single definite issue either of fact or law.' 7 Under the Codes,
facts are pleaded; and though we do not generally have the
formal joinder of issue,2s the process of affirmation and denial
is still resorted to for the purpose of isolating the material facts
and weeding out the irrelevancies. Under both systems the
functions of pleading are the same.5  The court must kmow the
or have had the opportunity of a hearing, that the law gives 2o conclusive
an effect to matters adjudicated." See also Roche v. McDonald, 2'9 Pac.
1015 (Wash. 1925); but cf. Mlach v. Blanchard, 15 S. D. 4., 90 N. W.
1042 (1902). For the same reasons a default judgment beyond the relief
demanded is reversible on direct appeal. Cf. Sache v. Gillette, 101 Iinn.
169, 112 N. W. 3S6 (1907); (190S) 11 L. R. A. (N. s.) S0'. But a de-
fault judgment on a complaint which fails to state a cause of action will
not be reversed if it is sufficient "to inform the defendant of the nature
of the claim against him." Trans-Pacific Trading Co. v. Paty Frocz-
Romper Co., 189 Calif. 509, 209 Pac. 357 (1922).
is Although a decree was "void," a party who "understood and acquiccel'
was "estopped" to deny its validity on collateral attach. Ecton v. Tomlin-
son, 278 Mlo. 282, 212 S. W. 865 (1919).
26 See Munday v. Vail, supra note 14.
: See STEPHENS, PLEADING (Andrews' ed. 1894) §§ 10O-103, in which it
is disputed that there can be only a single issue in causes which involve a
single "claim."
Is "No issue need be joined on demurrer nor need any pleadings be form-
ally closed either to court or the jury. . . . Co.". P&,c. Book (1922)
§ 208.
29 "It is one of the first principles of pleading that there is only occasion
to state facts which must be done for the purpose of informing the court,
whose duty it is to declare the law arising upon these facts and of apprizing
the opposite party of what is meant to be proved in order to give him an
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facts in order to give judgment. The adverse party must know
the facts in order to be given a fair opportunity to be heard, and
the facts must appear somewhere on the record in order that it
may be known subsequently what issues have been settled by the
suit or litigation. If these requisites are satisfied, the purpose
of the pleadings has been served.
To make certain that these conditions have been fulfilled,
written pleadings in proper form are generally considered neces-
sary. Where the suit is begun without a pleading, or a judgment
without or beyond the demand for relief has been rendered, or
a material fact is omitted from a pleading, or material facts are
merely orally pleaded, it may be desirable for the sake of cer-
tainty and the convenience of set working rules to penalize the
delinquent party by a reversal even though the facts might be
gathered from other sources on the record. As an insurance
of this certainty the Connecticut court perhaps correctly disap-
proved of the inception of an action by "so summary a proceeding
as a motion." 20 It is arguable, however, that the name which
the plaintiff gives his original pleading is immaterial, and that
so long as facts are pleaded with a disclosure of the relief de-
manded and no prejudice to the defendant appears, the court
should have examined the merits of the case. Thus, in a recent
Washington decision, an affidavit was allowed to do service as a
complaint; 21 and in Utah, a motion requiring proof of facts
extraneous to the record was granted nine years after the
original judgment had been made, over the objection of the
defendants that it was not a proper pleading.22 To this argu-
ment the only answer suggested in the Dreisbach case is the
desirability of forestalling any precedent for irregularity. Says
opportunity to answer or traverse it." CHITTY, PLEADING (1879) *2 35.
"The only object of pleading should be first, a fair general statement to
apprize the opposite party of the cause of action or defense, secondly, a
sufficiently exact statement in the pleadings of the issues, so that it may be
known afterwards what the judgment really decides." Arnold, The Prog-
ress of Law and Lawyers (1926) 60 Am. L. REv. 703. See BLISS, CODs
PLEADING (3d ed. 1894) § 138, where he lists the "objects of a written
pleading."
20 For cases in other jurisdictions discussing the use of a motion to begin
an action, see Tinn' v. District Attorney, 148 Calif. 773, 84 Pac. 152 (1906) ;
Mutual Reserve Fund Ass'n v. Smith, 77 Ill. App. 259 (1898); cf. Causey
v. Snow, 120 N. C. 279, 26 S. E. 775 (1897).
21 Reed v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 136 Wash. 7, 238 Pac. 990 (1925). Cf. Ginn
v. Knight, 106 Okla. 4, 232 Pac. 936 (1924) (where a document headed
"petition or motion" was held a motion).
22 Salt Lake City v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 43 Utah, 591, 137 Pac.
638 (1913). In this case the original decree recited that the court "shall
retain . . . original jurisdiction . . . for the purpose of all neces-
sary supplementary orders and decrees which may be required to mako
effectual the rights awarded and preserved by this decree"; but this would
seem to be equally true in the case of any judgment.
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the court: "A practice such as this, once permitted, will lead to
a general practice of attempting to restrict or extend the terms
of a judgment by the simple and informal method of a motion"
and "the certainty which would follow its adjudication will be
imperilled." 23 This seems to be aimed at a certainty of "forms"
rather than of the "facts" before the court. If the facts and
issues are clear to the defendant, to the court, and to anyone
making a later inspection, there would seem to be sufficient cer-
tainty whatever the plaintiff's pleading is called.
In the second ground of decision the court went further and
held that by reason of the oral demurrer the trial court "had no
power" to give judgment. The considerations in pleading a de-
murrer orally, however, do not seem to justify this conclusion.
No new facts are presented by demurrer. It is merely an admis-
sion of the facts already pleaded for the purpose of argument.
What function of certainty does the writing serve if the ftcit of
demurrer is apparent from the record? 2-  It would seem to be
an irregularity which could be waived, even on direct appeal.
Thus, in Massachusetts, it has been repeatedly held that a failure
of the defendant to plead to a complaint may be waived where
judgment was rendered on an agreed statement of facts 2 This
was, in effect, what happened in the instant case.
23 104 Conn. at 327, 133 Atl. at 101.
2 4 Veysey v. Bernard, 49 Wash. 571, 95 Pac. 1096 (1908) (oral demurrer
to a supplemental answer in the nature of a counterclaim. "The issues as
thus defined by the record and announced by the court v.ere clearly under-
stood"). The same is true in an oral plea of the general issue. "The only
objection against such a course would seem to be that it might not be full,
distinct, and certain. But this cannot apply in the present case; for it is
impossible that the plea of the general issue can be misunderstood by legal
minds." See Gwin v. Williams, 27 Bliss. 324, 333 (1S54). But cf. Ruffner
v. Hill, 21 W. Va. 152 (1882) (demurrer entered erroneously on private
records of judge; judgment reversed).
If an oral demurrer is held a "jurisdictional defect," qnxry as to the
propriety of an oral objection at the trial that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action (so-called demurrer ore tcnus). Cf. Lehner v. Rudinger,
201 N. W. 743 (Wis. 1925); but cf. Adams v. Way, 32 Conn. 1CO (180).
25 "Regularly, when this answer was over-ruled a further plea or answer
should have been filed. But we may take the agreed statement of facts as
a waiver of all questions of pleading and deal with the case upon these
facts." See Fay v. Locke, 201 Mlass. 387, .5S9, 87 N. E. 753, 75 (1909);
Bartlett -;. Tufts, 241 Mlass. 96, 99, 134 N. E. 630, 632 (1922) (direct
attack). In Chzrislonk v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 101 Conn. 356, 359,
125 Atl. 874, 875 (1924) it was stated that the parties "cannot confer juris-
diction by waiving this objection." This statement should be true only
where lack of jurisdiction is used in the sense of "no power." Blades v.
Des Mloines City Ry., s-2pra note 5. Compare Freeman v. Bank of La
Fayette, 20 Ga. App. 334, 93 S. E. 34 (1917) a case of collateral attack,
where the court said, "while parties cannot by consent give jurisdiction to
the court as to the subject matter of the suit, still where the pleadings are
such as authorised a legal judgment, the mere waiver by the plaintiff of a
particular pleading is one not involving the jurisdiction of the court, but
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The "uncertainty and confusion" and the demolition of "the
entire fabric of our system of written pleadings" which would
follow in the wake of an oral demurrer seems less a danger than
the court would have us imagine. It is possible to conduct legal
controversies without formal pleadings. In fact, more than fifty
years ago, the rule-making committee of the English judges ad-
vocated the abolition of all pleadings.26  To some extent their
purpose was accomplished by the development of notice pleading,
since adopted in some of our states.27 Also in the oral pleadings
of the small claims courts of many states, the necessity for sim-
plicity has overcome the cumbersome formalism of written
pleadings.28
But admitting some utility in requiring written pleadings, de-
murrers included with the rest, which justifies a reversal on
direct attack, imposition of a penalty for the sake of the rigidity
of the working rules would seem improper on collateral attack.2
Unless the defect is such as to cause a failure in the function
of fact apprisement, either to the parties, or to the court, or to
one subsequently interested, the judgment should be valid. If
the parties have been heard, or have had the opportunity of being
heard, and the material litigated facts may be gathered from the
record, judgments should not be disturbed. To declare an oral
demurrer to be a "jurisdictional defect," subject to both direct and
collateral attack, would seem to lose sight of pleading as a
process of gathering the material facts for the purpose of trial,
argument and record. At least, the Connecticut court should
limit the scope of its decision on the oral demurrer to direct
attack, and not extend it to cases of collateral attack.
H. L. N.
relates rather to how the court should exercise the jurisdiction it undoubt-
edly has, both of the person and the subject matter before it."
20See THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 366-368;
ROSENBAUM, RULE-MlAKING AUTHORITY (1917) 73-74, 129-130. Compare
the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CIVIL PRACTICE IN NEW YORK (1915)
drafting a provision for voluntary, informal submission to a trial court:
"Section 58. Parties may submit to a trial court or judge having jurisdic-
tion of the subject in controversy a matter in difference between them in
person or by attorney upon oral or written pleadings or statements to be
tried by the court or set down for trial before a referee or abitrator or
before a jury, under such procedure as to evidence and appeal and other-
wise, as may be agreed upon" [italics ours]. This suggestion was rejected
in the final enactment, and submissions were required to be in writing.
See N. Y. C. P. A., § 546.
27 See Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 501.
28 For example, see S. D. Rev. Code (1921) § 2145; Baldauf v. Nathan
Russel, 88 N. J. L. 303, 96 Atl. 96 (1915); see Smith, Small Claims Pro-
cedure is Succeeding (1924) 8 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 247.
29 See Rood, Is a Judgment Open to Collateral Attack If Rendercd With-
out WMitten Pleadings as Required by Statute, or If the Writings Do Not
Comply with the Statutory Requirements (1912) 10 MICH. L. REV. 384.
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PEACEFUL PICKETING IN NEW YORK, 1912-1926
Several recent decisions of the New York courts have been
thought to extend the restrictions wlch will be imposed on labor
union activity in respect to picketing.1 In the year 1925-1926
the New York Supreme Court four times declared that even
"peaceful picketing" is unlawful in the absence of a strike. In
Cushw.wn's Sons v. Awalga7nated Food Workers' Ba krs Local
No. 164, 127 Misc. 152, 215 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1926) the
defendant union was enjoined from distributing placards and
circulars stating the rate of wages granted by the plaintiff-
employer, and requesting the plaintiff's customers and the gen-
eral public to require the union label on bread; and in Traub
Amusement Co. v. Macker, 127 Misc. 335, 215 N. Y. Supp. 397
(Sup. Ct. 1925) "peaceful picketing" was enjoined on two
grounds: (1) that the defendant union had no grievance against
the plaintiff, since the "open shop" was not a justifiable source
of grievance, and (2) that the defendant union was seeking to
force the plaintiff to employ only members of the union. But in
Bolivian Panama, Hat Co. v. Finkelstehi, 127 lisc. 337, 338,
215 N. Y. Supp. 399, 401 (Sup. Ct. 1925) where "peaceful pichet-
ing" was also enjoined, the banners incorrectly stated that there
was a strike in progress at the plaintiff's business, and in Daitch
& Co. v. Cohen, 218 App. Div. 80, 82, 217 N. Y. Supp. 817, 818
(1st Dept. 1926) "peaceful picketing" was enjoined largely on
the ground that the plaintiff's business was small and that all
of his employees were members of his family or personal friends.-
An examination of both the facts and decisions in these cases
thus reveals that the New York Supreme court has only twice
held squarely that "peaceful picketing" is unlawful in the absence
of a strike. Moreover, within a year two decisions have directly
held that "peaceful picketing" is lawful even in the absence of
a strike. In Public BaLkihg Co. v. Stern, 127 Misc. 229, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 537 (Sup. Ct. 1926) the court refused to enjoin the de-
fendant union from causing its members to parade peacefully
in front of the plaintiff's shop bearing placards: "This union
label means shorter hours, sanitary shop, and safety to customers.
Workers and sympathizers, demand bread and rolls with the
union label," and in N. & R. Theaters v. Basson, 127 Misc. 271,
215 N. Y. Supp. 157 (Sup. Ct. 1925) the court refused to enjoin
the defendant union from maintaining pickets in front of the
plaintiff's theater carrying signs: "This theatre does not em-
ploy motion picture operators of Local No. 306 affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor." The opinion stated that
"Expressions have been found in cases that peaceful picketing
1 (1926) 99 CENT. L. J. 383; N. Y. L. J., OcL 27, 1926.
2See also Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, 195 N. Y. Supp. 558 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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is unlawful where there is no strike. But in those cases it will
be found that there was in interference with the business of
the employer whether by intimidation or misrepresentation." 3
It was formerly held in New York that labor unions were pri-
vileged to use the placard or circular in order to inform the
general public or customers that the plaintiff-employer is "un-
fair" to labor, regardless of whether "the purpose" be (1) to
force the employer to grant better working conditions or to
recognize the union,4 or (2) to peacefully persuade the plaintiff's
employees to join the union., Such labor-union activity has been
called picketing. In the cases which arose the courts tried to
distinguish on the facts, instances in which a labor union or its
representatives distributed information concerning the labor pol-
icy of a plaintiff-employer, 6 or requested the general public and
3 See Rentner v. Sigman, 126 Misc. 781, 216 N. Y. Supp. 79 (Sup. Ct.
1926).
4"Labor organizations have a right to appeal to the community at large,
or any specific member of the community, and request that he withhold
patronage from any person against whom they have a grievance." See
Maisel v. Sigman, 205 N. Y. Supp. 807, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
5 ". . . In cases which arose before the war [it seems established] that
a labor union may induce or persuade the employees of a manufactory or
other business, which is conducted . . . as an open or non-union shop,
to become members of the union, and to strike in order to compel the owner
to conduct his factory or business as a union shop." Rosenwasser Bros. v.
Pepper, 104 Misc. 457, 460, 172 N. Y. Supp. 310, 312 (1918).
"The defendants were justified in reasoning with plaintiff's employees in
an effort to persuade them to leave plaintiff's employ and in striving to
win the sympathy of the public in order that the latter might withhold
its patronage from the plaintiffs. . . . No just complaint can be made
by the plaintiff against the union's circularizing the neighborhood, asking
the friends of union labor not to patronize this plaintiff, nor can the plain-
tiff seek to restrain the union . . . from peaceably persuading proposed
patrons of the plaintiff from trading in his shop." Heitkamper v. Hoffmann,
99 Misc. 543, 547, 549, 164 N. Y. Supp. 533, 535, 536 (1917).
G Andrews, J., in Seubert v. Reiff, 98 Misc. 402, 408, 164 N. Y. Supp.
522, 526 (1917) : "I have no doubt that the union owning the label, or any-
one else, may recommend the purchase of goods on which it is placed, in
preference to others.
"The" trouble arises if a further step is taken, and dealers are threatened
with loss or injury in case they sell either unlabelled goods generally or
such goods made by a certain manufacturer. . . . It may be difficult
to state the distinction between a primary and a secondary boycott. I use
the word 'boycott' without any implication that it is in itself and under
all circumstances illegal. It may be said that, if one persuade customers
not to patronize a certain dealer between whom and the union a quarrel
exists, so one may persuade customers not to patronize one who deals with
the first. . . . But often, when it is sought to draw a line between
what is permissible and what is forbidden, it is difficult to say logically
why a certain act should be placed on the one side or the other. The
courts must be governed in their action by common sense and considerations
of public policy."
In N. & R. Theaters v. Basson, cited supra in the text, the court refused
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customers not to patronize him,7 and instances in which violence,
threats, or fraud were used by the labor union in an effort to
coerce the general public or customers of the plaintiff-employer
to abstain from all further business relations with him. In
that such picketing is unlawful in several other New York cases
year.9 The same judge who prolibited peaceful picketing in
the Bolivian Pa wma Hat case, later expressly privileged peaceful
picketing in the absence of strike in the Public Baking case, and
distinguished the former case on the ground that there the peace-
ful picketing was accompanied by misstatements. But the dic-
tum in the former case has been cited to support the proposition
that such picketing is unlawful in several other New York cases
within the year.10
Since the decision in the American Foundriecs case," New York
courts have as before, almost without exception, recognized the
to enjoin peaceful picketing in the absence of threat or coercion even though
the purpose of the defendant union was either to persuade the plaintiff
employer to discharge his present employees and engage members of the
defendant union, thereby breaking a contract with another union, or to
induce plaintiff's employees to join the defendant union. Contra: Traub
Amusement Co. v. Macker, cited sntpra in the text.
7 See Maisel v. Sigman, snpra note 4.
s Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919) (court
upheld an injunction against labor unions of Auburn, restraining the uce
of their powers over members to compel patrons of the plaintiff or the gen-
eral public against thd" will to refrain from dealing with the plaintiff).
9 N. & R. Theaters v. Basson, cited sztpra in text:
"Defendant had a right to make pacific appeal and use legitimate per-
suasion in its endeavor to induce plaintiff's customers and the ultimate con-
sumer to purchase bread made by its members. There is no evidence what-
ever here that the defendant resorted to the threat, coercion, intimidation
or fraud which it is forbidden to use. . . . Defendant's action was cal-
culated merely to advance its own cause and procure employment for its
own members. So long as it kept its conduct within theze bounds of the
law, the fact that the plaintiff was incidentally damaged thereby entitled
it to no legal redress.' See Public Baking Co. v. Stern, cited cvp7a in text,
at 231, 215 N. Y. Supp. at 539.
10 See cases cited supra in te.xt.
1 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.
S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921) (recognizes the right of men by "perzuasion
or communication with those whom they would enlist with them 'to accost
others' in an inoffensive way" and particularly "to communicate and dis-
cuss information with a view to influencing the others' action").
"It is clear that congress [in Section 20 of the Clayton Act] wished to
forbid the use by the Federal Courts of their equity arm to prevent peaceable
persuasion by employees, discharged or expectant, in promotion of their
side of the dispute. . . . This introduces no new principle into the
equity jurisprudence pf those courts. It is merely declaratory of what was
the best practice always." Taft, C. J., at 203, 42 Sup. Ct. at 76.
Workers in time of strike are privileged to strike and pichet peacefully.
Rentner v. Sigman, szupra note 3; Albee & Godfrey Co. v. Arci, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (court denied injunction against picheting on
the around that nroof Dresented by plaintiff showed no acts of violence or
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privilege of striking workmen to picket peacefully, 12 in the ab-
sence of an attempt to ifiduce a breach of contract between the
employer picketed and his employees. 13 What different courts
have at different times, even within New York state, considered
"peaceful picketing" shows far less unanimity.14 The reasons
which led the court in the American Foundries case, to limit
lawful picketing to the extent to which it did, seemed based on
the fear that even "peaceful picketing" in strike times will al-
disorderly conduct by pickets, or defendants, or persons acting on their
behalf); Berg Auto Trunk & Speciality Co. v. Wiener, 121 Misc. 796, 200
N. Y. Supp. 745 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (court granted part of injunction re-
quested so as to restrain picketing, which necessarily involved intimidation
according to the view of the Supreme Court in the American Foundries cases,
by limiting defendants to one picket at each entrance). Michaels v. Hill-
man, 111 Misc. 284, 181 N. Y. Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (injunction issued
against defendant union, limited to threats, intimidation, coercion and vio-
lence) ; Wood Mowing Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y. Supp. 95
(Sup. Ct. 1921). (laboring men not only are privileged to strike but also
to persuade others to strike and to attempt to persuade others not to take
their places); Wyckoff Amusement Co. v. Kaplan, 183 App. Div. 205, 170 N.
Y. Supp. 548 (2d Dept. 1918) (restraining order issued against defendant's
picketing modified in order to limit prohibited acts to those constituting
threats, intimidation, fraud, or injury to persons or property of plaintiff).
13Reed v. Whiteman, 238 N. Y. 545, 144 N. E. 885 (1924) (injunction
granted to restrain defendant union from persuading, inducing, enticing,
or attempting to entice employees to break employment contracts. Cardozo,
Pound and Lehman, J. J., dissented on the ground that no irreparable
damage was shown); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917)
(fact that defendant union in enforcing its by-laws, that members were not
to work with non-union men or on non-union material, did not interfere
with contracts between employer and employees or include force or fraud
was given by the court as one of the reasons for denying an injunction to
restrain defendant from circularizing customers of plaintiff, present or pros-
pective, to the effect that plaintiff was "unfair"); Vail-Ballou Press Co.
v. Casey, 125 Misc. 689, 212 N. Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (interference
by defendant union with contracts between plaintiff-employer and his em-
ployees enjoined); Best Service Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Dickson, 121
Misc. 416, 201 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (although an employee
retains power to breach contract of employment, employees, by engaging
themselves under contract, place limitations on right to act in concert).
14 In some cases the courts have granted injunctions restraining the de-
fendant unions from posting more than one picket at each entrance to the
plant of the plaintiff. Bellin v. Millinery Workers Union, Local No. 24, 127
Misc. 53, 216 N. Y. Supp. 68 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Berg Auto Trunk & Specialty
Co. v. Wiener, supra note 12. Or more than two pickets at a time at any
at one entrance. Reed v. Whiteman, supra note 13. Or more than six at the
main entrances and four at the others. Rentner v. Sigman, supra note 3.
In other cases the courts have required that the plaintiff present proof of
acts of violence or disorderly conduct on the part of the pickets. Albeo
& Godfrey Co. v. Arci, supra note 12. Or have expressly recognized that
what is peaceful picketing must be determined in the light of the circum-
stances of the particular case before the court. Michaels v. Hillman, 112
Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. Supp. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ("Picketing may be lawful
or unlawful. The legitimate purpose of it is to inform the strikers and
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most invariably lead to violence or public disturbance.'s During
a strike feeling runs high, men and women are out of work, and
to privilege any interference by the strikers at a time when they
see other men and women taking their places, seems a constant
source of danger. As a result the courts in some states have gone
so far as to hold all picketing illegal. 0 The attitude of the New
York courts in regard to picketing likewise seems conditioned
by considerations of strike agitation and violence. 7 The very
word "picketing" has therefore come to be bound up with the
narrow limitations supposedly necessary to protect the employer,
their union as to what is going on at the plants. Whatever number of pickets
was necessary to secure the reasonable and lawful purpose of the union is
sanctioned by law but where the number is swelled to 500 or G00 and
at times to 1,000 made up in part of workers from other factories, the un-
necessary and unlawful purpose to awe and intimidate by numbers is ap-
parent.").
1' "A restraining order against picketing will advise earnest advocates
of labor's cause that the law does not look with favor on an enforced dis-
cussion of the merits of the issue between individuals who wish to wor:
and groups of those who do not, under conditions which subject the in-
dividuals who wish to work to a severe test of their nerves and physical
strength and courage." American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Tradcs
Council, supra note 11, at 206, 42 Sup. Ct. at 77. "We think that the
strikers and their sympathizers engaged in the economic struggle should
be limited to one representative for each point of ingress and egress . . .
and that all others be enjoined from congregating or loitering at the plant
or in the neighboring streets by which access is had to the plant, that such
representatives should have the right of observation, communication, and
persuasion, but with special admonition that their communications, argu-
ments, and appeals shall not be abusive, libellous, or threatening, and that
they shall not approach individuals together but singly, and -hall not in
their single efforts at communication or persuasion obstruct an unwilling
listener by importunate following or dogging his steps." Ibid. at 20G, 42
Sup. Ct. at 77. "The name 'picket' indicated a militant purpose incon-
sistent with peaceable persuasion.' Ibid. at 205, 42 Sup. Ct. at 77.
3-rPierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Calif. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909); see
Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 60 So. 657 (1914) (all
picketing by labor unions held prohibited under Ala. Code (1907) § 6394);
See (1920) 7 VA. L. Rav. 462, 466, n. 13.
'7 See Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, su'pra note 2, at 562 ("even if [picketing]
ostensibly peaceful, it should not be permitted, when its purpose is in effect
a malicious and wanton interference, not only with another's business or
vocation but with the rights and interests of the public"). In Schwartz &
Jaffee v. Hillman, 115 Misc. 61, 69, 189 N. Y. Supp. 21, 25 (1921) Van Siclen,
J., said that peaceful picketing was a mere figure of speech; "That there
ever in reality existed or was practiced, 'peaceful picketing' is a question."
He adds: "Courts cannot find the balancing point [in the conflict between
capital and labor] by boxing the compass of judicial opinion from extreme
radicalism to ultra conservatism. They must stand at all times as the
representatives of capital, or captains of industry, devoted to the principle
of individual initiative, protect property and persons from violence and des-
truction, strongly opposed to all schemes for the nationalization of industry,
and yet save labor from oppression, and conciliatory toward the removal
of the workers' just grievances."
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the employees remaining at work or wishing to work, and the
general public against violence and public disturbance.1 8 Should
such reasons with their resultant limitations on the activities
of organized workers be applied when no strike is in progress,
and especially in cases where there is no complaint that the work-
ers have attempted to use unlawful means, i. e., means involving
violence, coercion, intimidation, or fraud?
In picketing cases the courts have only sometimes considered
the comparative bargaining power of the two parties immedi-
ately concerned, namely the employer and the employees or union.
They have, in New York, seemed to discriminate against labor
in this regard. On the one hand, they have considered it, al-
though not expressly, in order to enjoin a union from picketing
a small employer, who after a strike instead of employing either
his old union employees or a new set of workers, employed only
members of his family and a few friends.10 On the other hand,
they seem to have entirely disregarded it in enjoining a union
from attempting to induce employees to breach their individual
contracts with a certain employer,20 when they base their decision
on the ground that an employers' association had been, and
would be, enjoined from attempting to induce its members to
breach their contracts with union organizations.2-' The courts
here invoke the principle of mutuality of remedy; but this does
not seem justified, since, in the one case, the union attempted to
induce the breach of a contract a single employee had been forced
to sign, as a condition precedent to getting work, with a corpora-
tion, while, on the other, the employers' association had at-
temped the breach, a manufacturing corporation or employer
had made a contract with a union. In the latter instance there
was surely no such variation in bargaining power between the
contracting parties as in the former instance.
The purpose for which picketing is conducted seems to be a
subject of much concern to the courts.22 If the purpose of the
union activity is regarded as the advancement of the interests
18 Bellin v. Millinery Workers, supra note 14 (picketing limited to one
picket at each entrance); Berg Auto Trunk Co. v. Wiener, supra note 12
(picketing limited likewise); Reed v. Whiteman, supra note 13 (picketing
limited to two pickets at an entrance).1 0Altman v. Schlesinger, 204 App. Div. 513, 198 N. Y. Supp. 128 (lst
Dept. 1923) ; Yablonowitz v. Korn, 205 App. Div. 440, 199 N. Y. Supp. 769
(1st Dept. 1923).
20Best Service Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Dickson, supra note 13.
21 Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st
Dept. 1922).
221Bossert v. Dhuy, supra note 13 (court reversed an injunction issued
against defendant union on ground that all acts enjoined, under the find-
ings of fact, were lawful acts done for lawful purposes. It added that whore
acts of an employee, or employees in individual or associate capacity, were
reasonably and directly calculated to advance lawful objects, they should
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of the union and its members, and its intention is not primarily
to interfere with the business of the employer, it will not as a
-rule be enjoined in the absence of what is considered force or
fraud.23 The workers have not been required to justify a strike
or combination by proof that their objective lies within the
category of justifiable purposes, in a few New York cases where
any reason advanced by the workers that seemed to be to their
interest as members of the union was held sufficient, although it
might have seemed inadequate to the employer and orgaiized
society.24 Too often the courts offer as their major premise that
where the action is malicious it is unlawful; as their minor pre-
mise, that picketing in the absence of a strike is malicious; and,
as the inevitable conclusion that picketing in the absence of a
strike is unlawful. -  To interfere with the business interests
of another without justifiable cause is malicious, and the courts
thus assume that in the absence of a strike the activity of a
union, regardless of the purpose of the picketing, is malicious.
Such reasoning fails to answer the main point at issue since it is
scarcely cogent on the question of whether a labor union should
or should not be regarded as a stranger to the employer-employee
relation merely because no strike is in progress. This is espe-
cially true today where the strike forms only one and an increas-
ingly unimportant weapon in the bargaining struggle between
employers and their employees.
not be restrained) ; Rentner v. Sigman, sapra note 3 (although employees
have right to strike and to picket, neither may be used to accomplish a
clearly illegal purpose); Edelman v. Retail Grocery Dairy Cerle&' Union,
119 Misc. 618, 198 N. Y. Supp. 17 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (injunction in labor dis-
putes to be granted or withheld according to whether, from ituation vieved
as a whole, defendant's main purpose is to inflict injury on others rather than
promote legitimate advantages of its own members); Jacechel v. Kaufman,
187 N. Y. Supp. 889 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (injunction granted restraining de-
fendant union from striking and peaceful picketing on the ground that
the strike was not to better conditions of employeem, but rather for the un-
lawful purpose of interfering in plaintiff's business, i. c., to gain employ-
ment for men rightfully discharged because of business deprez.sion).
2 3 Bossert v. United Carpenters & Joiners of America, 77 Mice. 592,
137 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (informing union employees that they
are working on non-union material, in violation of by-laws of union, is not
enjoinable though it result in employees quitting their work); Heithamper
v. Hoffmann, supra note 5 (peaceful persuasion of sympathizers not to pat-
ronize plaintiff in an effort by defendant union to unionize plaintiff's shop
not enjoinable, although coercion and intimidation enjoined); X. & R.
Theaters v. Basson, cited supra in text; Public Baking Co. v. Stern, cited
supra in text; but where the court decided that the purpose of defendant's
activity was to interfere with plaintiff's business, it enjoined that act even
though the means were lawful.
24 aisel v. Sigman, supra note 4, at 814.
25 Stuyvesant Lunch & Bakery Corp. v. Reiner, 110 Misc. 357, 131 N. Y.
Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1920). But compare Taft, C. J., in the American Steel
Foundries ease, supra note 11, at 209, 42 Sup. Ct. at 78: "Union was ez-
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The courts in picketing, as in strike cases, sometimes seem more
affected by the terminology in which the purpose of the union
activity is expressed than by the other facts of the case. A ten-
dency is noticeable to be lenient where the immediate objective
is improved working conditions such as higher wages or de-
creased working day, and to be strict where unionization is the
immediate objective, in spite of the findings that the union shop
is sought as a means to those ends.20
To-day an increasing number of efforts are being made to de-
velop machinery, such as arbitration agreements, which shall
make the strike unnecessary. It would seem, therefore, that a
peaceful appeal to the general public when made by a union or
group of workers with the purpose of gaining the economic sup-
port necessary to achieve such improved working conditions
as they may strike for, should not be discouraged, where coercion
is not employed as against third persons.
ANTECEDENT DEBTS AS CONSIDERATION FOR MORTGAGES
Under what circumstances is a person taking a mortgage for
an antecedent debt treated as a purchaser for value so as to be
protected against "prior equities" of which he has no knowledge?
This old question is suggested anew by the recent case of
Williams v. Oconee County Bank, 134 S. E. 478 (Ga. 1926). In
this case, the plaintiff, for a valuable consideration, received
from his mother a properly executed deed of conveyance which
he failed to have recorded. Subsequently, the mother executed a
sential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.
It is helpfur to have as many as may be in the same trade in the
same community united, because in the competition between employers they
are bound to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade in the
neighborhood. Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge
their membership and especially among those whose labor at low wages
will injure their whole guild. It is impossible to hold such persuasion and
propaganda without more, to be without excuse and malicious."
26Jaeckel v. Kaufman, supra note 22 (court held that although labor or-
ganizations may by lawful means to secure adequate compensation and fair
hours; that picketing, while lawful if peaceably conducted, will not be per-
mitted when its purpose is to effect an interference with another's business) ;
Welinsky v. Hillman, 185 N. Y. Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (court granted
injunction on the ground that purpose of defendant was not to impose work-
ing conditions but to induce plaintiff to continue a manufacturing depart-
ment which he had abandoned); Edelman v. Retail Grocery Union, supra
note 22 (court granted injunction against defendant union on ground that
its real purpose was seen in threat to drive plaintiff out of business if he
did not yield to unionization efforts); Altman v. Schlesinger, supra note
19 (same); Traub Amusement Co. v. Macker, cited supra in text (court
granted injunction to restrain defendant from peaceful picketing on the
ground that the only purpose was to injure plaintiff's business to such an
extent as to force it to employ members of union, and none other than
members of union).
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mortgage deed of the same property to the defendant bank to
secure a pre-existing debt and any debt "which may hereafter
arise." At the time of the execution of the latter deed, the
mother, already indebted to the bank, obtained an additional loan.
The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the sale of this property
under the power of sale contained in the mortgage deed to the
bank. The upper court affirmed a judgment for the defendant
on the ground that the further extension of credit (referring to
the last loan made by the bank) constituted such "new considera-
tion" as would give the mortgagee priority for the amount of
the pre-existing, as well as the subsequently incurred, indebted-
ness.
If a sufficient consideration 1 is given for a mortgage, the
mortgagee is a "purchaser" within the meaning of the recording
laws.2 Between the original parties, a mortgage given to secure
a pre-exdsting debt is supported by a sufficient consideration 3
even though on the same facts, the mortgagee may not be pro-
tected against prior equities.- The courts, in upholding the
mortgage as between the original parties, are merely giving effect
to the papers according to the intention of the parties. But a
creditor receiving a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt is
not a bona fide purchaser for value entitled to protection against
prior equities whether or not he has notice of them.0  If, how-
For the necessity of consideration to the validity of a mortgage, ce
(1922) 2 Wis. L. REv. 59.
2 "This is declared by statute in some states, and in others it is a rule of
judicial construction . . . , the mortgagee is a bona fide purchaser for
value, and is protected against adverse claims of which he has had no
notice, including prior conveyances, and other existing liens and clams."
1 JONES, MlORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) § 459.
3 Moore v. Fuller, 6 Or. 272 (1877) (foreclosure procecdings); Greig v.
Mueller, 66 Or. 27, 133 Pac. 94 (1913) (cancellation proceedings).
4 Heuring v. Stiefel, 152 N. E. 861 (Ind. App. 1926). ". . . it is
well settled that a valid legal mortgage may be given to sceure a pazt
indebtedness without any new consideration or any forbearance or exten-
sion of the debt by the mortgagee, and such a mortgage will ran: in the
order of its priority over subsequent liens given for value. Such
a mortgage, [mortgagee] however, does not rank as a purchaser for value
so as to cut off prior equities." Stone, The "Equitable Mortgagc" inh Nco
York (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 519, 524. See also Alstin v. Cundiff, 52 Tex.
453, 464 (1880).
If the intention is to make a gift, there is no reason why the law should
withhold its sanction from this particular form of beneicence.
G Salisbury Savings Bank v. Cutting, 50 Conn. 113 (18.2); Hubert v.
Merchants' Bank, 137 Ga. 70, 72 S. E. 505 (1911); Smith v. Moore, 112
Iowa, 60, 83 N. W. 813 (1900); Senneff v. Brackey, 165 Iowa, 525, 146
N. W. 24 (1914); Western Grocery Co. v. Alleman, S1 Kan. 543, 106 Pac.
460 (1910); Harnish v. Barzen, 103 Kan. 61, 173 Pac. 4 (1918); McGraw
v. Henry, 83 Mich. 442, 47 N. W. 345 (1890) ; Ridings v. Hamilton Savings
Bank, 281 Mo. 288, 219 S. W. 585 (1920); Wilcox v. Drought, 71 App. Div.
402, 75 N. Y. Supp. 960 (1st Dept. 1902); Matter of Bedell, 67 Misc. 21,
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ever, he gives new consideration he is a bona fide purchaser.,
The distinction drawn between a mortgagee for a past con-
sideration and a mortgagee for a present consideration is amply
justified., The latter is afforded the protection of a purchaser
against prior equities of which he had no notice for the reasons
applicable to other innocent purchasers, i.e., in reliance upon the
title of record he has parted with goods or money, divested
himself of some legal right, or otherwise changed his position,
so that a denial of a preferred position would work him an
injustice." The former, on the other hand, has parted with no
legal right, nor has he placed himself in a worse economic posi-
tion than before.10 He is deprived of nothing; he still has the
claim for which he bargained in the past without requiring
security."" There is no public policy which warrants preferring
one who does not give new value.
The mortgagee is regarded as giving present consideration,
and thereby becoming a bona fide purchaser and entitled to the
benefit of the recording acts, if in reliance upon the security he
detrimentally changes his position, e.g., if he surrenders any
security 2 which he formerly possessed, or if he extends the
time '13 of .payment. These acts are regarded as sufficient con-
sideration. It has been said that ". . . the extension of tinle
124 N. Y. Supp. 430 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Breed v. Nat'l Bank, 171 N. Y. 048,
63 N. E. 1115 (1902); Orthey v. Bogan, 226 N. Y. 234, 123 N. E. 487
(1919); Temple v. Osborn, 55 Or. 506, 106 Pac. 16 (1910); Oliver v. Mc-
Whirter, 112 S. C. 555, 100 S. E. 533 (1919); Buckley v. Runge, 136 S. W.
533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Connecticut Investment Co. v. Demick, 105
Wash. 265, 1 7 Pac. 676 (1919); Malm v. Griffith, 109 Wash. 30, 186 Pac.
647 (1919). See also Larrabee Co. v. Mayhew, 135 Wash. 214, 223, 237
Pac. 308, 311 (1925); Fraham Bank v. Couger, 286 S. W. 657, 660 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926). Contra: Frey v. Clifford, 44 Calif. 335 (1872); Smitton
v. McCullough, 182 Calif. 530, 189 Pac. 686 (1920).
But the results are often affected by recordation statutes. These vary
so much that no general statement of their effect is possible. They are
not here considered and the cases cited were decided exclusive of their effect.
8 The same rule applies to the pledgee of stock to secure an antecedent
debt. "But the pledgee of stock to secure an antecedent debt of the pledger
is not a bona fide purchaser for value and therefore holds it subject to
any lien which is valid against the pledgor, though he had neither actual
nor constructive notice thereof." 4 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1909)
§ 4234.
9 See Cook v. Parhan, 63 Ala. 456, 461 (1879).
10 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 749.
" See Western Grocery Co. v. Allqman, supra note 6, at 547, 106 Pac. at
462.
12 Alstin v. Cundiff, supra note 4. "The extinguishment of the pre-exist-
ing debt, not a mere change in its form; the creation of a new debt, founded
upon a new consideration, giving a new day of payment, brings the Mort-
gagees in the relation of bona fide purchasers. . . ." See Cook v. Par-
han, supra note 9.
13 Whitfield v. Riddle, 78 Ala. 99 (1884); Dillard v. Propst, 212 Ala. 664,
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must be given at the time and in consideration of the mortgage.
A mortgagee is not considered a purchaser for value, merely
because the result of the mortgage may be to extend the time of
payment." 1- But in some cases where there was no affirmative
finding that the mortgagee parted with any value, courts have
inferred 1' an agreement to forbear; and where the time of pay-
ment was in fact extended, they have presumed i0 that the ex-
tension constituted the consideration.
There is another class of cases 17 holding that where there is
a conveyance in payment of a pre-existing debt, the grantee is
a purchaser for value. In such cases it seems unnecessary for
the creditor to surrender or cancel any written security in order
that his discharge may operate as consideration.5 This has been
criticised because it renders easy the commission of fraud.', It
leaves little protection to the rights of third persons, since it
makes their value depend upon the testimony of those whose
interest it is to destroy them.
In the case of negotiable instruments a different rule is ap-
103 So. 863 (1925) ; Tripler v. MacDonald Lumber Co., 173 Calif. 144, 159
Pac. 591 (1916); O'Brien v. Flickenstein, 180 N. Y. 350, 73 N. E. 30
(1905); Hunt v. Hunt, 67 Or. 178, 134 Pac. 1180 (1913); Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank v. Citizens Bank, 25 S. D. 91, 125 N. W. 642 (1910) ; Jiles v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 257 S. W. 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See also (1913)
23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 186.
14 JONES, op. cit. supra note 2, § 461. This accords with Mr. Justice
Holmes' theory of consideration; but he admits that "courts have gone very
great lengths" in holding a promise binding because of its "natural conse-
quences." See Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 117, C0 N. E. 397, 093 (1001);
AimERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT NO. 2, § 8.
' Perkins v. Trinity Realty Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 723, 61 AtI. 107 (1905),
aff'd 71 N. J. Eq. 304, 71 Atl. 1135 (1906).
'6 Brooks v. Asherton State Bank, 278 S. W. 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
17 Masterson v. Crosby, 152 S. W. 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; Harris v.
Evans, 134 Ga. 161, 67 S. E. 880 (1910) (where the conveyance is for
security, the grantee is not a purchaser for value; but otherwise where
there is an absolute conveyance in satisfaction of the debt); Adams v.
Vanderbeck, 148 Ind. 92, 45 N. E. 645, 47 N. E. 24 (1897) ; Retsch v. Rene-
ban, 16 N. M. 541, 120 Pac. 897 (1911).
is 2 PomROY, loe. cit. s2tpra note 10.
19 "Some legal rules ought to be settled in accordance with the results- of
experience and dictates of policy, rather than by a compliance with the
deductions of strict logic. To hold that a conveyance as sect'riy for an
antecedent debt is made without, but that one in satisfaction of such a debt
is made with, a valuable consideration, when the fact of satisfaction is not
evidenced by any act of the creditor, but depends upon mere verbal tcati-
mony, is opening the door wide for the easy admission of fraud. It leaves
the rights of third persons to depend upon the coloring given to a past
transaction by the verbal testimony of witnesses, after the event has dis-
closed to the creditor the form and nature in which it is for his interest
to picture the transaction. A rule which renders it so easy to defeat the
rights of others is clearly impolitic." Ibid.
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plied.20  A holder of a negotiable instrument given to secure a
past debt is a purchaser for value and enjoys the same position
as one giving a present consideration. This rule has been
codified in section 25 of the N. I. L. It is justified on the ground
of commercial expediency to encourage the credit and circulation
of negotiable paper. Both creditor and debtor are benefitted.
The former can safely give prolonged credit and forbear to take
legal steps. The latter is enabled to use his negotiable securities
as the equivalent of cash.2 '1
Exceptions are made to the general rule applicable to mort-
gages given to secure a past debt. One of these is where the
statute of limitations has since run and barred the personal
claim.2 2 Another is where, at the time of the original bargain,
the mortgagor promised to execute a mortgage in the future.-
In this case the mortgage is part of the agreed equivalent for
the original loan. The mortgagee parted with value in return
for the promise to give a mortgage, and the granting of the
mortgage is merely carrying out the agreement. But courts
are often hesitant in applying this principle because of the
danger of fraud, ' 4 and refuse to apply it where there is merely
a general agreement to furnish security.25
There is little authority, however, regarding the position of a
creditor receiving a mortgage given partly to secure a pre-exist-
ing debt and partly in return for a new consideration. A few
old cases hold that the mortgagee is a bona fide purchaser for
value of the entire mortgage.26 These cases may possibly be
explained on the ground that there was an extension of time on
the old claim. Several other cases hold the same regarding
20 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
21 See Swift v. Tyson, supra note 20, at 20.
22 Dunlap v. Green, 60 Fed. 242 (C. C. A. 5th, 1894); Tobin v. Benson,
152 S. W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
23 Ferris v Chic Mint Gum Co., 124 Atl. 577 (Del. Ch. 1924).
24 In re Great Western Mfg. Co., 152 Fed. 123 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
(machinery sold under agreement by vendee to give mortgage; mortgage
executed within four months of bankruptcy; vendor held not a preferred
creditor).
25 Where a broker obtained "day loans" (to be repaid in the course of
the day) from a bank for the purpose of taking up securities with the
understanding that the bank was to have a general lien on all the securities
in the hands of the broker, delivery of securities to the bank with notice
of the broker's impending insolvency is an illegal preference under the
Bankruptcy Act. National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U. S. 50, 34 Sup.
Ct. 20 (1913); Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Erust, 231 U. S. 60, 34 Sup.
Ct. 22 (1913) (holding, under similar circumstances, that a general promise
to give security upon demand puts the creditor in no better position than
an agreement to pay money).
2G Cook v. Parhan, supra note 9; Bank v. Bridgers, 98 N. C. 67, 3 S, E.
826 (1887); Branch v. Griffin, 99 N. C. 173, 5 S. E. 393 (1888).
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chattel mortgages.27  But one court holds that under such cir-
cumstances the mortgagee is a bona fide purchaser for value only
to the extent of the new consideration, - and that his lien for the
old debt is inferior to equities of which he had no kmowledge.
This seems to be the preferable rule.
It may be that if, under these circumstances, the mortgagee
is not given the position of a bona fide purchaser he will press
litigation and increase the difficulty of refinancing the loan. If,
on the other hand, he is given this position, he is given more than
he bargained for originally. But the problem of refinancing is
not a problem peculiar to cases where there is a present consid-
eration for part of the mortgage. It may be involved as well
where the consideration for the mortgage was wholly a past
indebtedness. In such cases, however, the effect of their deci-
sions upon the problem of refinancing has apparently not been
considered by the courts to be of prevailing importance.
The actual figures in the instant case are of interest. The new
loan amounted to about $200; the pre-existing debt amounted
to about $4,000. If $200 will operate to give the mortgagee
priority as to the $4,000 debt, then why not one dollar? Then
the entire rule applicable to mortgages to secure a past debt
where there is no new consideration becomes a mere empty form
to be defeated by "one dollar in hand received," leaving this rule,
which has received almost universal approbation from courts
and writers, to be like the old dotard in the si-th stage of life
"sans teeth . . . sans everything."
-7 Commercial Nat'1 Bank v. Pirie, 82 Fed. '799 (C. C. A. Sth, 1897);
Merchants' Bank v. Soesbe, 138 Iowa, 354, 116 N. W. 123 (1903); Hees v.
Carr, 115 Mich. 654, 74 N. W. 181 (1898).28 Wells v. Morrow, 38 Ala. 125 (1861).
